"The Chinese room experiment from John Searle says that syntax is not the same as semantics: a symbol-processing machine like a computer can never be properly described as having a "mind" or "understanding" , regardless of how intelligently it may behave. The poor guy in the Chinese room can translate perfectly following the set of rules, but he does not understand a word of what he translates.

Since Marvin Minsky's "Society of Mind" we know that a society of agents is probably a better model for human intelligence. What happens if we replace the guy in the Chinese room by the population of a whole country or nation?

If an entire nation systematically organizes itself to operate just like a brain, with each individual replacing a group of neurons, then the system will act like a real mind, with mental states, consciousness,etc. The problem is that such a simulation must be fastenough. Let us assume it is fast enough for the moment. Different parts of the population may represent different things. Although no individual knows Chinese, the population as a whole can know the meaning.

The population might collectively feel pain/joy by loosing/winning members, while no individual member of the population experiences any pain/joy. If the population is large and complex enough, can it represent and recognize itself? Do we have a spirit of China "hovering over the room" in this case? How would a recognition or representation of itself look like?"